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The recent European Union(EU) draft legislation on label-ing and tracing all food and
feed consisting of, containing, or
produced from genetically modified
(GM) organisms has the potential to
significantly affect long-run U.S. agri-
cultural exports to Europe. For the
last three years, a de facto morato-
rium has halted approval of new GM
varieties in the EU. Whereas the pro-
posed new EU legislation may help
resolve this impasse, the details of
this draft legislation are raising con-
siderable concern in the U.S. agricul-
tural community and, if approved,
are likely to give rise to a serious
trade dispute within the World Trade
Organization.
It seems that this EU proposal
marks an increase in the interna-
tional divergence in the way new bio-
technology products are being
regulated. Some have suggested that
differing GM product regulations in
the United States and in the EU can
be traced back to the EU reliance on
the “precautionary principle.”
Whereas the EU has embraced such
a concept as the guiding principle in
developing its new regulations on
GM food, the United States has re-
sisted explicitly recognizing it.
BACKGROUND
The principle of precautionary action
is rooted in German environmental
law and was first applied internation-
ally at a 1987 London conference
dealing with the protection of the
North Sea. This concept was adopted
in the 1992 United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Develop-
ment, where it was succinctly
described in one of the principles of
the Rio Declaration: “Lack of full sci-
entific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective
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measures to prevent environmental
degradation.” The Biosafety Protocol
agreed to in Montreal in 2000, the
first international agreement with
provisions aimed at regulating trade
of GM products, also explicitly ap-
peals to the precautionary principle.
These applications of the precau-
tionary approach dealt with environ-
mental risks, but the EU Commission
made a substantial extension of its
scope last year by adopting it to deal
more generally with risk to “ …the
environment, human, animal and
plant health,” effectively expanding
the use of this principle to include
food safety.
The extension of the precaution-
ary principle to deal with food
safety, and in particular its use to
regulate GM food, has been very
controversial. Some have charged
that the principle is unscientific.
Others have argued that it is a logi-
cal fallacy to rely on this principle
to establish the safety of new prod-
ucts because it amounts to impos-
ing an impossible burden of proof.
This conclusion is based on inter-
preting the precautionary principle
to mean that a new product or a
new technology should not be ap-
proved as long as there is the possi-
bility of some harm being done, that
is, effectively demanding a conclu-
sive proof of zero risk. But this ren-
dition of the precautionary
principle is untenable.
RATIONAL CHOICE UNDER RISK
How should we deal with the risks
that inevitably are associated with a
new technology?  Suppose we need
to decide between allowing a new
GM variety and not allowing it.
When the choice involves genuine
uncertainty (something is not
known for sure), decision theory, as
developed by economists and statis-
ticians, emphasizes the crucial as-
pects of trading off benefits and
costs across possible “states of the
world.” If for all possible contingen-
cies the new variety gives only posi-
tive outcomes, then the choice is
obvious. But typically that is not the
case, and we must trade off net posi-
tive benefits that accrue when ev-
erything turns out smoothly with
the net costs that accrue when a
negative outcome actually material-
izes. This trade-off requires that we
know the size of net benefits or
costs in each possible state of the
world and the probability of that
contingency to arise (so that, for
example, a catastrophic outcome
that is believed possible only with a
very small probability can still have
a substantial impact on choice).
Furthermore, this trade-off depends
on the risk tolerance of the
decisionmaker. This much is clear
for individual choices: one person’s
desired portfolio allocation be-
tween stocks and cash is not neces-
sarily optimal for another person.
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The problem is more complex
when we deal with risk trade-offs
not for an individual but for society.
But the essence of the problem is
the same. What is the role of science
in this framework?  Quite clearly,
science has a lot to offer in identify-
ing the various possible outcomes
of an action and the probability that
can be associated with each pos-
sible outcome. But science is not of
much help in deciding what the opti-
mal level of risk exposure should be
(just as an economist cannot tell
you how much of your portfolio to
put in stocks). That is why risk regu-
lation has traditionally distin-
guished between “risk assessment”
and “risk management.” Risk assess-
ment is the technical step, and re-
lies heavily on scientific evidence,
whereas risk management is the
policy stage, where a decision is
made on how much risk can be tol-
erated (conceivably in exchange for
expected net benefits).
Does application of the precau-
tionary principle necessarily lead
to a drastically different way of
dealing with and regulating risk?
No, it does not. The precautionary
principle should be interpreted as a
tool for risk management, the
policy stage of choosing the opti-
mal risk exposure. Its basic tenet is
that, when some uncertainty exists
about the outcomes of an action,
this uncertainty must be factored
into the choice problem. This is ex-
actly what decision theory man-
dates! Viewed in this light, the
precautionary principle is less ob-
jectionable, but it is also not as
novel and is perhaps redundant. In-
deed, even when the precautionary
principle is not invoked explicitly,
regulatory actions aimed at risk
can be construed as being consis-
tent with it. For example, the 1998
U.S. decision to withhold approval
of StarLink maize for human con-
sumption (because of the possibil-
ity, to this day unverified, that its
particular Bt protein could be an
allergen) arguably can be charac-
terized as a textbook application of
the precautionary principle.
THE REAL ISSUES
Differing and incompatible na-
tional regulations for GM food
could prove crippling to the com-
modity-based international trading
system for agricultural products.
Harmonization of such regulations
is imperative if the heralded gains
from biotechnology innovations in
agriculture are to be realized. A
rational and credible process for
dealing with the potential risks of
these new technologies is, of
course, crucial. In this context, an
ideological opposition to the pre-
cautionary principle is misplaced.
Reliance on the precautionary
principle need not bias public
choices against new technologies
when it is seen in the context of
risk management (as opposed to
risk assessment). The unresolved
issue, perhaps, is how to make the
precautionary principle opera-
tional in a transparent way, so that
it can be translated into effective
policy choices that strike an opti-
mal trade-off between benefits and
risks of new technologies.
If the EU policies on GM prod-
ucts are perceived as too cautious,
it may be because either  “exces-
sive” risk aversion is being built
into regulations, or incorrect pre-
sumptions on possible outcomes
and their probabilities are being
used. In the latter case, science
can be of considerable help in dis-
pelling misconceptions, and more
scientific evidence on various im-
plications of GM products is
needed. In the former case, the
question to ask is, why pick on GM
products? If very different risk
standards are being used with re-
spect to GM products (relative to
traditionally bred varieties, for ex-
ample), then this point needs to be
attacked directly, not peripherally.
Regulating risk requires that we
understand what to be afraid of,
and to what degree, but there is no
need to be afraid of the precaution-
ary principle. u
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